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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Section 250 may have some small effect on ex parte sister state decrees, but
it is more likely to be superfluous or held unconstitutional depending on the
amount of evidence the assailant is able to present.
In the area of foreign country decrees where a New York court is not bound
by the constitutional mandate of full faith and credit, the application of section
250 will be open to debate. The effect of the act in this area is not likely to be
recognized as a statutory overruling of Rosenstiel and prior case law.
One difficulty in understanding the New York legislators' intention in
enacting section 250 is its past history. The same statute has had little or no
effect in ten other enacting states for the past eighteen years. The inherent defects
in draftsmanship would seem to prejudice the statute's chances for being constitutionally sustained under judicial scrutiny. The Supreme Court decisions in
the area of divorce recognition since it was first enacted may indeed destroy the
usefulness of the act.
When these factors are combined with the lack of legislative notes or comments to section 250, its existence is not easily reconciled with its supposed goals.
It would appear that when the New York legislature finished reforming the
divorce laws it added section 250 primarily to keep New Yorker's divorces before
New York courts.
MIcHAnrI L. MCCARTHY

THE "UNFAIR" INTERESTED DIRECTORS' CONTRACT UNDER THE
NEW YORK BUSINESS CORPORATION LAW
According to the majority common law rule a contract between a director
and his corporation, or between corporations with interlocking directorates, will
be enforced if the contract is basically "fair" to the corporation but may be
avoided if "unfair." 1 This rule seems to have been extended by section 713 (a) of
the New York Business Corporation Law, which provides in part:
713. Interested directors.-(a) No contract or other transaction between a corporation and one or more of its directors, or between a
corporation and any other corporation, firm, association or other entity
in which one or more of its directors are directors or officers, or are
financially interested, shall be either void or voidable for this reason
alone or by reason alone that such director or directors are present at
the meeting of the board, or of a committee thereof, which authorizes
such contract or transaction, or that his or their votes are counted for
such purpose:
(1) If the fact of such common directorship, officership or financial interest is disclosed or known to the board or committee, and the
1. See generally 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations§ 1307 (1965); Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 1062,
1064 (1954).
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board or committee authorizes such contract or transaction by a vote
sufficient for such purpose without counting the vote or votes of such
interested director or directors;
(2) If such common directorship, officership or financial interest
is disclosed or known to the shareholders entitled to vote thereon, and
such contract or transaction is approved by vote of the shareholders; or
(3) If the contract or transaction is fair and reasonable as to the
corporation at the time it is authorized by the board, a committee or
the shareholders.
A literal reading of this statute indicates that the "interested director's contract"
may not be "void or voidable for this reason alone" if any one of the three
alternatives has been satisfied. Prior to the Business Corporation Law the courts
of New York generally followed the common law rule requiring that these contracts be fair; hence section 713(a) on its face seems to offer a more lenient
test in that the interested director must demonstrate merely that full disclosure
of his position has been made to either the board or the shareholders. These
provisions thus raise the intriguing question of whether disclosure alone will be
sufficient to validate a transaction which was in fact unfair at the time of its
approbation. The New York courts have followed a general trend toward increased liberality in the treatment of these agreements, although there appears
to be no precedent enforcing an unfair interested directors' contract Nearly a
century ago it was said that "every contract entered into by a director with his
corporation may be avoided by the corporation within a reasonable time, irrespective of the merits of the contract itself." 3 The essence of this harsh rule was
more firmly established in the landmark decision of Munson v. Syracuse, G.&C.
R.R.,4 and in many subsequent New York cases; oddly enough, Munson has
never been directly overruled, at least prior to the appearance of section 713.
However, a 1913 case held that an interested director's contract is valid when
ratified by the shareholders of the corporation, 5 and another contemporary
decision suggested that such transactions should be upheld if prefaced by open
and honest disclosure on the part of the interested directors.0 The emergence of
the "fairness" standard as the functional (if not the formal) test was evident in
the Court's treatment of Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co.,7 where
Judge Cardozo cautioned that "the constant duty rests on a trustee to seek no
harsh advantage to the detriment of his trust, but rather to protest and renounce
2. For a thorough inquiry into the "crazy-quilt of authority" of the common law in
New York, including most of the cases herein cited, see Hoffman, The Status of Shareholders

and Directors Under New York's Business Corporation Law: A Comparative View, 11
Buffalo L. Rev. 496, 558-69 (1962).
3.
1884).
4.

Metropolitan Elev. R.R. v. Manhattan Elev. R.R., 11 Daly 373, 503 (N.Y.C.C.P.
103 N.Y. 59, 8 N.E. 355 (1886).

5. Goss v. Goss, 147 App. Div. 698, 132 N.Y. Supp. 76 (1st Dep't 1911), aff'd, 207 N.Y.
742, 101 N.E. 1099 (1913).
6. Billings v. Shaw, 209 N.Y. 265, 103 N.E. 142 (1913).
7. 224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E. 378 (1918).
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if through the blindness of those who treat with him he gains what is unfair."8
The famous Supreme Court case of Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co.0
established the rule that the burden of proving the basic fairness of the contract
falls squarely upon the interested or common director who seeks to maintain the
transaction,' 0 although the strict application of this principle in New York was
subsequently modified by Everett v. Phillips." A later case involved a dispute
concerning the fairness of a gas price fixed by a contract negotiated between
corporations with interlocking directorates; it was held that the transaction
might be avoided if unfair to the injured party despite the fact that the common
12
directors had acted in good faith and upon the advice of competent engineers.
This decision suggests that the unfair interested director's contract may be
avoided in New York regardless of other surrounding circumstances, and seemingly is in accord with the prevailing common law rule.
The impact of section 713 (a) upon the common law has not yet been evidenced by judicial interpretation, and the thrust of the statute has been appraised solely in the writings of several legal scholars. Some inquiry has been
directed at the question of whether the burden of proof has been placed on the
interested director, following the Geddes rule,13 or has been shifted conclusively
to the plaintiff in accordance with the interpretation frequently given Everett v.
Pkillips.14 It is generally agreed that the new statute is not explicit on this
point,15 and placement of the burden seems to remain in the same uncertain
state that it was heretofore. With regard to the issue of the unfair contract,
however, there is unanimous agreement that section 713(a) alone will not
operate to affirm a transaction which was basically unfair at the time of its
authorization.' 6 A California statute, nearly identical to section 713(a),1 7 has
been construed to require fairness in interested director's contracts despite
8.
9.

Id. at 492, 121 N.Z. at 381.
254 U.S. 590 (1921).

10. "The relation of directors to corporations is of such a fiduciary nature that transactions between boards having common members are regarded as jealously by the law as are
personal dealings between a director and his corporation, and where the fairness of such
transactions is challenged the burden is upon those who would maintain them to show their
entire fairness.. . ." Id. at 599.
11. 288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E.2d 18 (1942).
12. Chelrob, Inc. v. Barrett, 293 N.Y. 442, 57 N.E.2d 825 (1944).
13. See supra note 10.
14. 288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E.2d 18 (1942). See Kessler, The New York Business Corpora-

tion Law, 36 St. John's L. Rev. 1, at 76 n.306 and accompanying text (1961).

15. See Israels, Corporate Practice 208 (1963) ; Kessler, supra note 14, at 76.
16. See Israes, op. cit. supra note 15, at 135. "The important factor is that not even a
statutory provision can operate to validate a basically unfair transaction." Id. at 208. "Section
713 does not purport to deal with the validity of the contract or transaction,and mere disclosure
of a directors' interest will not alone serve to validate such a contract or transaction where
there is evidence that the disclosure was not full and fair, unfair advantage was taken by
the interested director, or some other impropriety or fraud characterized his dealings with the
corporation." Hoffman, supra note 2, at 567. "Probably the qualifications in the statute and
its Comment will be sufficient to preserve the rule that an unfair contract will be invalidated
even where adopted without the interested directors' vote." Kessler, supra note 14, at 76.
17. Section 713(a) is a near-duplicate of Cal. Corp. Code § 820 (Deering 1947), with
the notable exception that the "good faith" requirement in the California statute is not
found in § 713 but has been made the subject of § 717 in the New York scheme.
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technical compliance with the statutory disclosure provision," 8 and it is likely
that the New York courts will incorporate this requirement into the interpretation of the new provision. 19
The unfair contract casts upon the interested director a presumption of
improper or "bad faith" motives, and the weight of the common law combined
with the statutory interpretation given the California cases indicates that mere
disclosure under section 713 (a) will not operate to save a basically unfair contract. However, several questions still remain. What if the presumption of bad
faith is effectively rebutted by the interested director? If this alone is not
enough, might it make any difference if the interested director or his defendant
corporation will suffer a substantial loss if the contract is avoided? Another
problem is raised by the language of section 713 (a) (3), directed at the transaction which is fair and reasonable "at the time it is authorized by the board, a
committee or the shareholders." What of an agreement satisfying this requirement, but which develops into an unfair contract after its authorization?
Section 713 (a) deals exclusively with interested director's contracts, stating
that such contracts shall not be "void or voidable for this reason alone"; thus
there is an implied invitation to subject the transaction to the tests imposed by
other applicable portions of the statutory law. First among these is section 717,
requiring directors to discharge their duties "in good faith and with that degree
of diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under
similar circumstances in like positions." Also pertinent is section 720, providing
in part that a director may be compelled to account for his negligent or willful
violation of certain corporate duties.
Noting the coordinated thrust of these three sections, consider again the basic
question of whether under any circumstances the unfair contract could--or
should-be upheld under the new statutory scheme. The range of the various
possibilities is illustrated in the following hypothetical situations:
D is a director and large shareholder of both the ABC and XYZ
corporations; there are no other coiiimon directors or shareholders.
ABC and XYZ enter into a twenty-year lease by which ABC agrees to
pay a fixed annual rent for the use of a large commercial building owned
by XYZ. D's interests have been fully disclosed to the boards of directors of both corporations. Five years later the state constructs an
expressway exit immediately adjacent to the leased property. Commercial property prices skyrocket, and the fair rental value of the
building in question climbs to approximately four times the contract
price. XYZ now seeks to avoid the allegedly unfair agreement, relying
solely on D's common interest.
First. Assume D had "inside" information concerning the proposed exit
prior to the authorization of the lease agreement, and sought to gain an advantage
for ABC. Is there any possibility of saving the contract? Clearly not. D has
18. The best-known and most widely quoted case in point is Remillard Brick Co. v.
RemiUard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952).
19. See Hoffman, supra note 2, at 566-67; Israels, op. cit. supra note 15, at 208.
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breached the "good faith" requirement of section 717 and the lease may be
avoided as having been basically unfair at its inception. Disclosure alone as
provided in section 713 cannot operate to validate a transaction under circumstances such as these.
Second. Assume both parties had bargained in good faith, the rental price
was fair when established, and there is no indication that plans for the exit were
in existence when the agreement was reached. ABC argues that the contract was
fair and reasonable when made, and that the common law rule is applicable only
to transactions unfair at the time of their authorization. XYZ maintains that
unfairness may be established by the results of the contract, 20 and further
suggests that section 717 requires an interested director to seek avoidance or
modification of an unfair transaction regardless of when the unfairness develops,
in accordance with Judge Cardozo's reasoning in Globe Woolen.2l There is
substance to both arguments, and a decision either way could be justified by a
careful balancing of equities.
Third. Assume the building is located in a city one hundred miles distant.
Neither ABC nor XYZ were familiar with rental values in the area, and the
contract price was set by a competent local real estate firm. Plans for the new
expressway exit had been announced several months before, but that fact was not
made known to the parties here, and its inflationary effect on nearby property
was ignored by the local realtor in establishing the rental figure. Thus the
contract actually was unfair when authorized, but was entered into in good
faith and with due care according to the requirements of section 717. Many
years ago it was argued in Billings v. Shawi22 that the interested director should
be given his advantages under the agreement if entered into in good faith, but
the precise situation here seems to be controlled by Chelrob,2 which held that
good faith based on supposedly competent outside advice is not enough to save
the unfair contract. The frequently expressed rationale of this and related cases
is that the common director should not be permitted to reap "excessive profits"
at the expense of the injured corporation.
Fourth. Assume the same facts as above, except ABC uses the building
exclusively for dead storage and maintains that no excessive profits have been
realized. This argument has more appeal than the last, but the courts might point
out that the fruits of appreciation have flowered and ripened regardless of
whether the defendant has bothered to pluck them.
20. In Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d
66 (1952) several consecutive annual sales contracts were attacked by the plaintiff; the trial
court validated the contracts for the first year on the reasoning that the advantages were
speculative when the contracts were made, but all later agreements were struck down since
the results of the original contracts assured the defendants of unfair profits under the subsequent agreements. On appeal the first year's contracts were also held voidable, the rationale
being that "all of the contracts are voidable not because profits were or were not certain,
but because of the inherent nature of the transactions." Id. at 422, 241 P.2d at 76.
21. Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 121 N.E. 378 (1918).
See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
22.

209 N.Y. 265, 103 N.E. 142 (1913).

23.

Chelrob, Inc. v. Barrett, 293 N.Y. 442, 57 N.E.2d 825 (1944).
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Fifth. Again assume the same basic facts, but ABC subsequently gave up
its operations some two years after the agreement went into effect and subleased the remainder of its interest in the property to an unrelated third party,
at the same rent called for in the orginal contract. Thus it is established that no
excessive profits are involved, and also that ABC may be liable for sustantial
damages to the sub-lessee if the agreement is avoided. In this instance a balancing of equities might well indicate that the "unfair" contract should be upheld,
and statutory justification for this interpretation requires merely a literal interpretation of section 713 (a) since full disclosure satisfying sub-paragraph (1)
has been made.
These examples have been designed to suggest that in every dispute concerning an interested director's contract the court must first address itself to the
question of whether there has been an abuse of the good faith and due care
requirements of section 717. Good faith is specifically required in the California
counterpart of section 713,24 and there is no doubt but that bad faith or any
other impropriety on the part of the interested director will be sufficient grounds
to avoid the contract regardless of compliance with other provisions of the law.
With regard to the unfair transaction, it is only after the requirements of sections
717 and 720 have been satisfied that attention should be directed to section
713 (a), which at that point in the proceedings may serve three important functions:
First, it should preclude the possibility of enforcing any prior
agreement, by-law, or provision in the certificate of incorporation which
is contrary to the conditions specified in this section.
Second, the defendant's burden should be limited to showing
full and honest disclosure by the interested director to either the board
or the shareholders by whom the contract was authorized.
Third, the contract in question may then be validated if either
one of the disclosure requirements has been satisfied.
The common law "fairness" test tends to weigh the effects of the transaction
heavily in favor of the plaintiff, while the defendant's interests are shrouded
beneath a heavy presumption of wrongdoing; 2 5 thus the above proposal would
prevent the interpretation of the new section from being blanketed by the occasionally inequitable common law standard. The interested director's contract
is frequently of great mutual benefit to the parties involved, and the thrust of the
law should be toward the protection of such agreements when entered into in
good faith, with due care, and at arm's-length to as great an extent as possible. If a
transaction is ultimately shown to have been unfair, then section 713 (a) provides
the statutory machinery to validate such a contract when justice and a balancing
of equities so dictate.
MAx E. SCHLOPY
24. Cal. Corp. Code § 820 (Deering 1947).
25. Note the courts' struggle with the application of the "fairness" standard in Case v.
New York Cent. R.R., 19 A.D.2d 383, 243 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1st Dep't 1963), rev'd, 15 N.Y.2d
150, 256 N.Y.S.2d 607 (1965).

